The Mathematician’s Withdrawal:
The Role of Theodorus in Plato’s Theatetus

Martin A. Gallagher (University of Kansas)

In recent years, we have witnessed a conspicuous upsurge in “literary” or “dramatic” readings of Plato’s dialogues.  Such readings allow for a deeper appreciation of the dialogue form itself and, in terms of content, the integrity of each phase in the dialectal development of arguments, which Plato himself has Socrates famously defend at Phaedrus 264c.  At times, however, these readings set themselves against “philosophical” or “analytic” readings (Nails, 1995), mitigating the possibility of their ability to more fully illuminate philosophical content. Plato’s use of the dramatic dialogue suggests both that the literary form is useful for conveying philosophical ideas, or perhaps even in arriving at them, and that this form is not vacant of philosophical significance.

Plato’s Theatetus has been largely ignored among literary or dramatic readers, with one notable exception.  R. Blondell’s recent (2002), admirable book on character in the dialogues succeeds in avoiding the dichotomy of the philosophical and the literary Plato, and thoroughly explores the dramatic and philosophical “play of character” between Socrates and Theatetus.  Blondell, however, has little to say about the characterization of Theatetus’ teacher, Theodorus .  She does note that Theodorus refuses to join in the dialogic combat in which Theatetus has so admirably engaged (165ab).  This paper aims to fill that gap by more fully analyzing the dramatic role of Theodorus in the dialogue and the philosophical implications of that role. 

When Socrates poses the central question of the dialogue about the nature of knowledge, Theodorus withdraws from the discussion, and asks his erstwhile student, Theaetetus, to answer in his place. The language of courage, manliness, and contest in the dialogue is conspicuous: Theodorus’ unwillingness to engage in the dialogue betokens an intellectual weakness and fear on his part.  Theodorus’ outright refusal to answer is a lack of the parresia praised at Gorgias 487abd.  Those lacking parresia are unable to put Socrates to the test (basanizein), they are not up to the challenge posed by dialogical contest.  The acceptance of the challenge is critical to the effectiveness of Socrates’ maieutic method, since it is a commitment to undergo the metaphorical pains of childbirth that Socrates thinks to be implied therein (151ab).  For this reason, Socrates exhorts Theatetus to take up his challenge (peiro, an epic expression) immediately after the speech about maieutic method, and assures him that if he proves to be manly (andrize), which Theodorus has failed to do, he will be able to address the question.

I argue that Plato’s characterization of Theodorus both reflects and further illuminates his treatment of mathematics in relation to philosophy.  Math receives a privileged role in Platonic philosophy, placed on the upper half of the divided line in the Republic, and the intellectual objects of math are akin to Plato’s forms.  Nonetheless, Plato’s praise of the discipline is not without reservation: the hypothetical procedure of mathematics will not do for philosophy because it does not explore the logoi of its presuppositions (Morrow, 1977).  This exploration is not successful in the Theatetus, and it is plausible that Plato himself did yet know how to make it successful.  Nonetheless, the dialogue stands as a call to the young in Athens to have the courage to face the difficult toils of discovering what knowledge is.

Bibliography

Blondell, R.  The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues.  (Cambridge, 2002).

Morrow, G.  “Plato and the Mathematicians.”  In Philosophical Review 79(1970), vol. 3: 309-333.

Nails, D.  Agora, Academy, and the Conduct of Philosophy.  (Dordrecht, 1995).